information integrity的八卦，Yahoo名人娛樂都在討論

【#廸在英國：10月17日行程及最新進展】

朱凱廸自己一人於10月17日，即英國當地時間早上6時到埗，隨即開展調查行程，要求英方回應梁君彥退籍疑點。

朱凱廸與周永康、一群居於倫敦的港人剛到內政部門外抗議英方配合中國施壓，以特惠待遇審批梁君彥申請，不惜賠上英國文官制度及中立性（詳見《致內政大臣的公開信》），最終干擾香港自主，操縱立法會主席選舉，也有損英國內部行政誠信。

接下來，朱凱廸將於當地下午3時半（約香港時間晚上十點半）接受 #BBC 英國廣播公司直播訪問，屆時「八鄉朱凱廸」專頁將會直播訪問，與香港人同步了解最新資訊及英國本地就事件的看法。

（更正：由於訪問在直播室中進行，屆時未能在此專頁中提供 Facebook Live，見諒！）

另外，朱凱廸將於當地時間下午5時正（香港時間晚上12時正）會見英國 ＃工黨 影子外交國務大臣 Catherine West，就梁君彥事件及英國政府處理手法進行討論。

請各位繼續留意事態發展！

＊特此感謝在當地照應的香港朋友們！

Chu Hoi-dick had arrived at Britain on 17th October. The purpose of this trip was to investigate and demand for a response from the British government concerning the renunciation of Andrew Leung.

Chu, Alex Chow, and other Hong Kong people residing in London had just gathered and protested outside the Home Office, protesting against the British government’s giving in to the demands of the Chinese government, granting discretion to Andrew Leung’s application of renunciation. The British government’s decision had sabotaged the neutrality of the government, and had severely interfered the autonomy of Hong Kong; such act is equivalent to manipulating the election of the Legislative Council, and had impaired the integrity of the Home Office.

Chu will be on BBC, attending an interview at 3 p.m. British time (10 p.m. Hong Kong Time) . Our Facebook page will be live streaming the interview, providing simultaneous information and also views and opinions from Britain.
(Update: As the interview was conducted in the studio, we are unable to provide live streaming of the interview. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.)

Chu will also be meeting Catherine West, the shadow Foreign Office Minister at 5 p.m. British Time (12 a.m.Hong Kong Time), discussing with West the incident and the handling of such by the British government.

We will be updating continuously the latest news. Stay tuned for further information.

Special thanks to all Hong Kong people assisting us in UK!

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【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

#大家去泰國喜歡看歷史遺跡嗎
#小編超愛的~~~💛🧡💚
#泰國第一個王朝 #素可泰

素可泰歷史遺跡公園看起來好好拍照喔!!
這個被列入世界遺產的地方，有不少具有紀念性的建築，像是瑪哈泰寺、卓旁難寺⋯等～你也可以選擇租腳踏車在這邊逛逛哦～

素可泰位在曼谷跟清邁之間，雖然說離清邁近一點，但也要300公里，約5個小時車程距離～
另外也可以選擇搭國內線轉機到彭世洛/素可泰機場，再搭車前往唷～💪🏻💪🏻💪🏻
#小編好奇提問 #有粉絲去過這裡嗎

☞ 去曼谷必看曼谷幫，超在地吃喝玩樂報你知
http://bit.ly/bangkokgoplay

☀️❤️วันสบายๆในสุโขทัย สัมผัสมนต์สเน่ห์เมืองเก่าในรูปแบบใหม่สุดจะชิว

📸💕มาปั่นจักรยานชมวิว พร้อมนั่งรถรางรับบรรยากาศเมืองเก่า สะด๊วกกสะดวก แถมมุมถ่ายรูปเพียบ!

😮หากจะพูดถึงแหล่งท่องเที่ยวทางประวัติศาสตร์ที่ยังคงความดั้งเดิมและคงความสมบูรณ์มากที่สุด ก็คงหนีไม่พ้น อุทยานประวัติศาสตร์สุโขทัย👍🏻

🌳อุทยานประวัติศาสตร์สุโขทัย อยู่ตรงข้ามพิพิธภัณฑสถานแห่งชาติ รามคำแหง ห่างจากตัวจังหวัดสุโขทัยประมาณ 12 กิโลเมตร บรรยากาศโดยรอบถูกห้อมล้อมไปด้วยต้นไม้และใบหญ้าสีเขียว ทำให้ดูร่มรื่นย์สบายตา เมื่อมาถึงแล้วสิ่งแรกที่ต้องทำคือซื้อบัตรเข้าชมอุทยาน หากใครอยากจะนั่งรถรางหรือปั่นจักรยานรอบอุทยานที่นี่ก็มีให้บริการเช่นกัน ❤️

🌅หากมองผิวเผินภาพลักษณ์อณาจักรสุโขทัยในยุคสมัยก่อนคงเพื่องฟูไม่เบา โดยวัดวาอารามที่ได้ถูกสร้างขึ้น ล้วนมีความสวยงามและความอลังการซ่อนอยู่ ขนาดเราที่ไม่ใช่นักโบราณคดี ไม่ได้หลงใหลในประวัติศาสตร์มากยังรู้สึกขนลุก ตะลึงในความสวยงามเมื่อได้เข้าไปเยี่ยมชมในบริเวณอุทยานแห่งนี้🌄

🍃บริเวณอุทยานโดยรวมทั้งหมดมีพื้นที่ที่กว้างขวาง แต่เราสามารถที่จะชมโดยรอบๆได้โดยนั่งรถรางตามที่กล่าวไปข้างต้น แล้วลงในจุดที่เราอยากจะเดินชม รออีก10-15 นาทีก็จะมีรถรางรอบต่อไปมาจอดรับ🚃

🚲ถึงแม้ว่าพื้นที่โดยรอบของอุทยานจะมีขนาดใหญ่มาก แต่เราจะได้รับแผนที่มาด้วยตอนซื้อบัตรเข้าอุทยาน ซึ่งจะเป็นตัวช่วยในการบอกข้อมูลของสถานที่แต่ละจุดของอุทยานได้อย่างดี ซึ่งเราไม่ต้องกลัวจะหลงทิศหลงทางเพราะมีเจ้าหน้าที่อุทยานคอยอำนวยความสะดวกอยู่รอบๆอุทยานเลย☺️

📸ต้องบอกว่ามาทั้งที แนะนำให้เที่ยวให้ครบในทุกจุดของอุทยาน ไหนๆได้มีโอกาสไปเยือนทั้งทีแนะนำให้เก็บให้ครบเลยนะ😘

❗️ออกทำกิจกรรมกลางแจ้งทั้งทีโชคดีที่มี BANANA BOAT Dry Balance ครีมกันแดดเนื้อบางเบาแถมยังซึมซับง่าย สู้แดดท่ามกลางบรรยากาศเมืองเก่าได้อย่างเต็มที่โดยไม่ต้องกังวล แถมกลิ่นครีมก็หอมยิ่งทำให้น่าใช้มากๆเลยด้วย💕

‼️สามารถหนีเที่ยวได้ที่
อุทยานประวัติศาสตร์สุโขทัย จ.สุโขทัย
📞เบอร์ติดต่อ : 055-697527
📍พิกัด : goo.gl/maps/LPMGbEdBpPR2

#SneakOut #หนีเที่ยว #SneakOutSukhothai #หนีเที่ยวสุโขทัย #Sukhothai #สุโขทัย #SneakOutThailand #หนีเที่ยวไทย #เที่ยวเมืองเก่า
☀️❤️ Chilling day in Sukhothai. Experience the enchantment of the old city in a new way. Chilling.

📸 Come to ride a bike to see the scenery and take a tram to get the atmosphere of the old town. It's convenient and there are plenty of photos

To talk about historical attractions which are still traditional and most full of integrity, it wouldn't be able to escape Sukhothai Historical Park. 👍🏻

Sukhothai Historical Park, opposite to Ramkhamhaeng National Museum, about 12 kilometers from Sukhothai province. The surrounding atmosphere surrounded by trees and leaves of green grass makes it happen. Looks pleasant when arriving. The first thing to do is buy tickets to the park if anyone wants to ride a tram or bike around the park is also available. ❤️

🌅 If you look superficial, the appearance of Sukhothai in the modern era, it's not lightly fluffy by Wat Waaram that was built. There is beauty and extravaganza hiding. We are not archaeologists. Not passionate about it. Much history still creeped out at the beauty of this park 🌄

The total park area has ample space, but we are able to view the surrounding by taking the tram as mentioned above and down to where we want to walk. Wait 10-15 minutes for the tram to pick up next round.

Although the surrounding area of the park is very large, we will have a plan that comes with us when we buy park tickets. This will help us to inform information about each park's locations. We don't have to be afraid to get lost because there is a park officer waiting for us. Facilitating around the park ☺️

I have to say that I have come. I recommend you to travel to all places in any park. I have a chance to visit. I recommend you to collect all of them. 😘

❗️ Outdoor activities. Lucky to have BANANA BOAT Dry Balance. Light sunscreen. Easy to absorb. Fight sunlight in the old city's atmosphere. With no worries. The cream smell is very good. It's very nice to use. 💕

!!️ can escape to travel at
Sukhothai Historical Park, Province. Sukhothai
Contact number: 055-697527
Location: goo.gl/maps/LPMGbEdBpPR2

#SneakOut #หนีเที่ยว #SneakOutSukhothai #หนีเที่ยวสุโขทัย #Sukhothai #สุโขทัย #SneakOutThailand #หนีเที่ยวไทย #เที่ยวเมืองเก่าTranslated

Chinese parks are quite a different sort of experience, other than being a place for people to try and sell off their sons and daughters for marriage to other families, it's the only place people are really able to go out and practice their kung fu, dancing, singing, musical instruments etc. Of course there are the regular activities such as having a picnic, hiking and playing sports (as well as some boating and fishing) available as well. Come and join Sasha and I as we get the low down on how Chinese parks work.

The primary goal of attending the marriage market is for parents to find a suitable partner for their child. The standards of finding the right match may be based upon (but not limited to) age, height, job, income, education, family values, Chinese zodiac sign, and personality. All of this information is written on a piece of paper, which is then hung upon long strings among other parents' advertisements for their children. The parents walk around chatting with other parents to see if there is a harmonious fit only after their children's standards are met.

Umbrellas used for advertising
Many parents do not have permission from their child to go to this event. It has been described as "match.com meets farmers' market" with a low success rate. In many parents' eyes, parent matchmaking gatherings such as the Marriage Market are the only way to uphold a traditional dating style for their children in modern China. China's long idealized tradition of continuing their family lineage is very important within Chinese culture. As the children of the One Child Policy start to become of typical marriage age, the so-called marriage "market" of China has wavered in stability, particularly for males in China. The University of Kent predicts that by the year 2020, 24 million men will be unmarried and unable to find a wife.

Recently, well-educated women in China with established careers are in less of a hurry to get married. They have more options than women in past generations and are not afraid to put their career first. This change in marriage ideology puts the women in a higher position of power within a traditionally male-dominated society. Now more women seek to find a responsible man with personal integrity instead of just a high paying job.

Many men's standards have changed with the progression of women's status in the work industry as well, they expect a woman that has been educated and well on her way to a career path. But what has drastically changed is the older generations viewpoint on the subject—they agree with the younger generation, with the two most important qualities in a wife being "elegance and a decent career path," quite a change from "diligence and the willingness to suffer the burden of life".

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China's most iconic gaming console is the "Red White Machine" otherwise known as a famiclone (knockoff NES or knockoff Famicom) the company that has been producing them in China non-stop for 30 years has just released the 30th Anniversary version of their "Red White Machine", I got my hands on one and decided to talk about how gaming in China has always had a bit of a difficult history.

Video games in China is a massive industry and pastime that includes the production, sale, import/export, and playing of video games. China is the largest and highest grossing (revenues) video game market in the world, since 2015. The landscape of the topic is strongly shaped by China's average income level, rampant software piracy, and governmental measures to control game content and playing times. In 2011, China's PC game sector was worth $6 billion, the largest in the world. Arcade games are also a thriving industry in China. Console games were banned from the country in 2000, but the ban was lifted in July 2015.

In eSports, China has been the top country in terms of tournament winnings, possessing some of the world's best talents across video games.

The Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau have unique legal and cultural environments, thus the information below does not apply in these two regions.

As with almost all mass media in the country, video games in China are subject to the policies of censorship in China.

Violating basic principles of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
Threatening national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
Divulging state secrets
Threatening state security
Damaging national sovereignty
Disturbing social order
Infringing upon others' rights

On July 2015, the ban on video game consoles within the country was lifted. According to a statement from the country's Ministry of Culture, companies like Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft — among others — will now be allowed to manufacture and sell video game consoles anywhere in the country.

Game consoles were first banned in 2000 due to fears that the devices — and the 3D worlds produced by them — had a negative effect on the mental and physical development of children. In 2015, China eased those restrictions by letting game console-makers operate in an experimental 11-square-mile area in Shanghai, known as the free trade zone.

The State General Administration of Press and Publication and anti-porn and illegal publication offices have also played a role in screening games.

Examples of banned games have included:

Hearts of Iron (for "distorting history and damaging China's sovereignty and territorial integrity")
I.G.I.-2: Covert Strike (for "intentionally blackening China and the Chinese army's image")
Command & Conquer: Generals - Zero Hour (for "smearing the image of China and the Chinese army")
Battlefield 4 (for "smearing the image of China and endangering national security")
In addition to banning games completely, several games have had their content screened to remove certain imagery deemed offensive or unfavorable. Common examples include skeletons or skulls being either fleshed out or removed entirely. Cases of which can be seen in Chinese versions of popular video games such as DOTA 2 and World of Warcraft.

⚫ Watch Conquering Southern China (my documentary) and see China like no one outside of China has ever seen it before: https://vimeo.com/ondemand/conqueringsouthernchina
⚫ Support me on Patreon: http://www.patreon.com/serpentza
Join me on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/winstoninchina
Twitter: @serpentza
Instagram: serpent_za
My other channel: https://www.youtube.com/c/advchina
Music used: Virtual Vice - Sanctuary Run
Artist's bandcamp: https://virtual-vice.bandcamp.com/releases

Privacy is a fundamental pillar of our society. The advertisement-based model of our internet is a threat to our freedom. Phil and Göran discuss why privacy came into mainstream focus again via Cambridge Analytica and why it opens the door for the manipulation of our society.

While many countries increase their surveillance system to a sophisticated level, Europe is pioneering privacy rules with the GDPR.

About idka: https://www.idka.com/
Idka is a new type of social media where protection of your privacy, your integrity and your information is at the very core. On Idka you can communicate, share and work undisturbed with colleges and friends. There is no advertising, nothing irrelevant and no-one can see, share or access your stuff. Communicate freely on a platform where you own the content.

Music: Hadassah

Phil Chen
Instagram / Twitter: @philchen913

HTC Exodus
www.htcexodus.com
Instagram: @htc.exodus
FB/Telegram/Reddit: @htcexodus

Rebuilding trust, one phone at a time.