constitutional中文的八卦，Yahoo名人娛樂都在討論

【回覆新筆友選舉主任蔡亮女士：我的立場不曾改變，改變的只是政治審查的環境】

新筆友蔡亮女士好「客氣」，問我三條問題。不過唔緊要，政府越多來信，越留難我，越拖延決定我到底有無得選，只會令海怡西既選民更不滿政府既審查同篩選。

我會把握機會詳盡咁向蔡亮女士解釋我嘅政治理念，希望佢唔好強行讀心亂咁詮釋我既答案。

我無興趣比佢讀我個心啊。

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香港香港仔海傍道3號
逸港居1樓
海怡西選區
選舉主任蔡亮女士

蔡亮女士：

就 閣下於2019年10月26日電郵來函，本人謹覆如下：

問題一：你作為香港眾志現任秘書長，加上你於2019年10月17日就選舉主任的提問所作的回覆中表示你 「支持香港眾志所提出的民主自決理念」，你是否同意，不論是上述香港眾志奉為「最高綱領」的民主自決理念，或是你理解中並支持由香港眾志提出的民主自決理念，兩者均包括提倡和支持香港獨立是自決前途的選項之一？

1. 閣下引述2018年10月2日報導當中本人對譚耀宗先生的回應，惟我認為該報道與 閣下考慮我的提名有並無關連。該報道的背景是譚先生曲解香港眾志的主張，將民主自決等同香港獨立。我在回應時指出「香港眾志不會改變民主自決綱領」，意在澄清民主自決並非獨立，香港眾志亦無意改為主張香港獨立。

2. 正如香港眾志常委及首席研究員敖卓軒在2019年10月24日《華爾街日報》評論文章指出自決不等同於香港獨立：
Beijing is always going to call us separatists, but independence is not one of the present movement’s demands. Fighting for democracy within our constitutional framework is going to get us closer to what ‘one country, two systems’ was meant to do. Self-determination does not equal independence.

3. 就閣下查詢「香港獨立」是否我或香港眾志所支持的「自決前途」的選項之一，其實我在10月15日回覆原選舉主任馬周佩芬女士的信函中已回應此問題。 閣下可參考如下：
- 本人的立場是任何香港未來前途的決定，應在一國兩制的憲政框架內進行。
- 《基本法》第十二條列明，香港特別行政區是中華人民共和國的一個享有高度自治權的地方行政區域，直轄於中央人民政府，而自決前途亦是在中華人民共和國的主權下進行。
- 支持民主自決並不代表支持香港獨立於中華人民共和國中央政府。
- 我認為任何成為自決前途選項的主張，其先決條件是擁有相當民意基礎，以符合民主原則。

4. 任何成為自決前途選項的主張，其先決條件是擁有相當民意基礎，以符合民主原則；然而，自決前途的前提是在承認《基本法》和中華人民共和國的主權下進行。中華人民共和國中央政府對香港特別行政區擁有主權，中國國家主席習近平更於2019年10月13日嚴詞威脅：「在任何人企圖在中國任何地區搞分裂，結果只能是粉身碎骨」。因此，即使有關主張是否具有民意基礎，不論香港眾志奉為「最高綱領」的民主自決理念，或是我理解中並支持由香港眾志提出的民主自決理念，均不提倡和支持香港獨立作為民主自決的一個選項。

問題二：你於2019年10月15日回答選舉主任在2019年10月14日電郵來函中指出：
“本人提倡支持香港人可以自決前途，即香港特別行政區在《中英聯合聲明》基本方針政策於「五十年不變」限期屆滿後的前途問題，應讓香港人共同參與決定。而本人的立場是任何香港未來前途的決定，應在一國兩制的憲政框架內進行。”在你10月17日的回覆指出：“如你認為我跟眾志的看法有異，你應該根據我的看法作出決定"。你的上述回覆，看來可予人的印象是，你的個人取態，與香港眾志「主權在民」和港獨的取態，可以有所分歧。現在你作為區議會選舉獲提名人，請直接清晰確認你這方面的立場是否曾作任何改變，即不再認同香港眾志在2016年提倡的民主自決的網領？你是否不再認同香港眾志的綱領中所指體現 「主權在民」的理念，公投應包括香港獨立為選項之一？

5. 香港眾志「民主自決此際起航——我們的自決運動路線圖」的文章提到「體現『主權在民』的理念」，而這與《中華人民共和國憲法》第二條：「中華人民共和國的一切權力屬於人民」的意思同出一轍，說明作為擁有香港特別行政區主權的中華人民共和國，同樣涵蓋和反映「主權在民」理念。事實上，時任中華人民共和國副主席習近平於2010年9月也在中國共產黨中央黨校開學典禮的講話中提到「權為民所賦，權為民所用」，表達與「主權在民」類近的看法。

6. 正如我在早前的回覆所強調，具民意基礎和符合民主原則，是前途自決選項的先決條件，這也是「民主自決」涵蓋的要素。而我認為香港眾志對民主自決的理解，是透過自決前途表達香港人的意願，讓香港人共同參與決定香港特別行政區在《中英聯合聲明》基本方針政策於「五十年不變」限期屆滿後的前途問題。我相信這並不違背《基本法》賦予一國兩制，高度自治的原則；至於主權在民所體現的精神，是以民主方式在香港社會凝聚共識，從而決定香港未來。

7. 就文中提到「我們同意公投應該包括獨立和地方自治等選項」的背景，是對香港社會大眾在2016年存有各種政治主張，包括但不限於地方自治和港獨的概括描述。文中對各個選項的提述，實是客觀反映當時香港市民可能支持的各種政治主張，以強調民意基礎的重要性。然而，這並不代表香港眾志提倡自決前途需要具備必然選項。

8. 根據中大傳播與民意調查中心於2017年間公佈的民意調查，市民支持「香港獨立」作為2047年後安排的比率跌至只有11%。從上述民調可見，「香港獨立」的主張在現時「一國兩制」框架下的香港特別行政區顯然不擁有相當民意基礎，並不具有成為自決前途選項的先決條件，所以自決前途不應包括香港獨立作為選項。我重申，目前具有壓倒性支持的主張是「五大訴求，缺一不可」，包括要求香港特別行政區政府根據《基本法》落實雙普選，亦是香港眾志和我的訴求。

9. 正如上述，無論任何主張是否具民意基礎，自決前途的前提是在承認《基本法》和中華人民共和國的主權下進行。在現時「一國兩制」框架下的香港特別行政區，有關主張與《基本法》第一條列明「香港特別行政區是中華人民共和國不可分離的部分」有所牴觸，故此我不提倡和支持香港獨立作為民主自決的一個選項。

10. 無論如何，我的立場不曾改變，改變的只是政治審查的環境，惟 閣下錯誤地理解本人或香港眾志對民主自決的主張，選擇性地提述有關的內容，並非我所支持「民主自決」的主張的全部。我認為自決前途的作用在於表達香港人的意願，我相信這並不違背《基本法》賦予一國兩制，高度自治的原則。

問題三：現在你作為區議會選舉獲提名人，是否同意在符合《區議會條例》（第 547 章）第 34（1）（b）條要求獲提名人示明會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特行政區這規定的前題下，不論是否有民意基礎，不論目的為何，不論以任何形式來進行（包括透過具有憲制效力或不具實際約束力的公投），香港獨立都不可作為民主自決的一個選項？

11. 我認為你的問題錯誤地理解我對民主自決的主張。

12. 我認為在一個不具實際約束力的民意表態的方式下，香港獨立可作為民主自決的一個選項。正如我較早前引述2017年香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心曾就「市民對2047年後香港的前途問題之看法」進行調查，這種討論和調查絕對不會違反《基本法》任何規定。同樣地，一個不具實際約束力的民意表態方式如公投，讓市民就香港特別行政區在《中英聯合聲明》基本方針政策於「五十年不變」限期屆滿後的前途問題表態，本質上與上述民調無異。除非 閣下認為於民意調查要求市民就「香港獨立」表態乃違反《基本法》，否則這類民意表態並不可能違反擁護《基本法》及支持香港特別行政區的聲明。

13. 作為區議會選舉獲提名人，我已根據《區議會條例》在提名表格內所作出關於擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特行政區的聲明。我在10月17日的答覆中引述周庭案（[2019] HKCFI 2135）的誓章指出，香港眾志無意自行舉辦公投，而是期望說服政府舉辦一個具國際認可及具憲制效力的公投。必須強調，不論公投是否具有法律效力，其結果所反映的民意最終均會由中央政府及港府考慮和決定。在中華人民共和國中央政府對香港特別行政區擁有主權的前提下，尤其是中國國家主席習近平於2019年10月13日嚴詞威脅「任何人企圖在中國任何地區搞分裂，結果只能是粉身碎骨」，我認為實際上香港獨立並不可成為可接納的選項。

二零一九年區議會選舉
海怡西選區參選人
黃之鋒

二零一九年十月二十六日

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw

各位，生成器也許已沒有用了。選管會一天就收到4500封電郵。看來，大家炸他電郵還是有點用的。

以下乃沈大師言為「內部AO提供範本」。的確是官話文章，請先仔細閱讀，才選擇是否發出電郵吧。

你還有5小時。

请广传，好人一生平安。

[#官方資訊] 早前分享了一位高級政務官朋友就《逃犯條例》爭議的感受，得到數千轉載，迴響十分熱烈，也有不少公務員私訊回應。本頁對象一直以黃藍以外的專業人士為主，雖然平日只分享國際視野資訊，但在關鍵時刻，也希望為一些平日對社會抽離的朋友，提供更多資訊參考。以下是我的另一位AO朋友擔心局勢惡化，希望以自己的方式真正為特區政府服務，因此以私人身份草擬的意見書，回應特區政府選舉管理委員會關於區議會選舉的官方諮詢，並使用了完美官僚理據、格式和文法，就DQ候選人提供了詳細意見。根據官方資訊，《逃犯條例》收到4500份意見書，其中3000份「贊成」，因此發出意見書並非毫無價值。這位AO表示，大家可以直接使用這格式，根據個人觀點加減內容直接電郵遞交，因為香港人大家都忙，這過程只需一分鐘，應該最符合成本效益。截止日期是7月10日或之前，請廣傳，好人一生平安。

10 July 2019

Chairman
Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC)
By Email: eacenq@eac.hk

Dear Chairman,

Public consultation on District Council Election proposed guidelines

I write to object to Chapter 3 of the Proposed Guidelines, as it gives Government an unjust, unfair, and unchecked power to disqualify any candidate during the nomination period by reason of Government’s own political motives.

Chapter 3.1 of the Proposed Guidelines says that : “Under the law, the validity of a candidate’s nomination is to be determined by the Returning Officer (RO). The EAC is neither empowered nor involved in the making of such decision and would not provide any advice on the decision made by the RO”.

Chapter 3.9(b) of the Proposed Guidelines describes the requirement by which a candidate must declare (through signing a “Confirmation Form” by the EAC) that he would uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the HKSAR.

It is totally unclear whether a Confirmation Form duly signed by a candidate is itself sufficient to discharge the candidate’s duty to declare his willingness to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the HKSAR when he is elected to the office.

Previous elections showed that an RO, who was a civil servant (pitched at Administrative Officer Staff Grade C / District Officer) appointed to the role of RO prior to the election, could make subjective and arbitrary judgment about a candidate’s state of mind and political orientation, with selective reference to some or a few past writings, speeches, statements, expression of opinions, posts in social media platforms in relation to the candidate, instead of merely looking at a Confirmation Form duly signed.

I find it outrageous to see that Ms. Anne Teng, then District Officer (Eastern) appointed to the role of RO in a legislative council by-election last year, could refuse to acknowledge a confirmation form signed by Miss Agnes Chow Ting and disqualify her, citing absurd and arbitrary reasons with reference to some of Miss Chow’s previous remarks or those of her political party, and without giving Miss Chow a fair opportunity to respond to those reasons uttered unreasonably by the RO.

The Proposed Guidelines shows that the EAC has failed its duty to introduce any additional safeguard or measures to plug this unreasonable, unlawful and unconstitutional loophole, which may still be freely exploited by any RO in the next election driven by bad faith and political motive.

It is unacceptable that the EAC could confess that it is “neither empowered nor involved in the making of such decision and would not provide any advice on the decision made by the RO” (Chapter 3.1). I question how the EAC can still “ensure that an election is conducted openly, fairly and honestly at all times” – its statutory duty enshrined in the Electoral Affairs Commission Ordinance - when it is not involved in scrutinising or monitoring the exercise of an RO’s power in disqualifying any candidate at the RO’s own political preference.

The Guidelines did not describe in detail how an RO could, on his or her own, research during the short nomination period the political belief and past sayings of any candidate. The Guidelines are also silent as to whether the RO would have received biased or secret advice from any agency such as Department of Justice, Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Home Affairs Department, Information Services Department, etc., which may have compiled a detailed recollection of a candidate’s previous remarks in advance. It was suggested by some that such a compilation of speech or opinion records prepared by any agency other than the RO could have assisted the RO unlawfully in reaching a dangerous disqualification decision to deprive a candidate of the right to stand for the election.

I must remind the EAC that the right to stand for election is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 25 also states that “political opinion may not be used as a ground to deprive any person of the right to stand for election.”

I am disappointed to see that the proposed Guidelines have not offered anything substantive to protect a candidate from the RO’s unlawful interference in the election by disqualifying candidates he or she dislikes. The EAC must look at this carefully to see what it can do.

The current remedy about determining the lawfulness of an RO’s disqualification decision through an election petition to be adjudicated later by the court one or two years after the actual election is totally unsatisfactory, with the lapse of time which delays the timely delivery of a just outcome.

I stress that I object to Chapter 3 of the Proposed Guidelines in its entirety. I urge you to review all the processes described in Chapter 3 again and independently. In so doing, you must resist all political considerations wrongly dictated by the Chief Executive, Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Department of Justice, or other government agency seeking to disturb the fairness and integrity of the forthcoming district council election.

Yours sincerely,

XXXX

更新：有熱心網友翻譯為中文版，並對原文作出修訂，請隨便share／修改：

10 July 2019

選舉管理委員會主席 鈞啓

選舉管理委員會主席鈞鑒： 關於區議會選舉活動建議指引公眾諮詢事宜

本人謹致函對建議指引第三章表達反對意見。建議指引第三章將賦予政府不公平、不公正以及不被箝制的權力，容許政府於提名階段取消香港市民的參選資格，以迎合政府自身的政治目的。

建議指引第三章第一部分（3.1）指：「根據法例，候選人的提名是否有效 ，完全是由選舉主任作出決定，選管會無權並一向沒有參與， 亦不會給予任何意見。」
建議指引第三章3.9(b) 要求候選人透過簽署選管會擬備的確認書表明他／她擁護《基本法》並保證對香港特別行政區效忠。

至於候選人是否能夠簽署確認書就能滿足擁護《基本法》並保證對香港特別行政區效忠的要求，建議指引對此完全沒有清晰交代。

過往選舉顯示，首長級丙級政務官／民政事務專員級別的公務員於選舉前獲委任為選舉主任，便能夠就候選人的思緒及政治取向作出主觀且隨意獨斷的決定，並只需揀選候選人往日曾經發表的文章、言論、宣言、意見表達、社交媒體帖文以及社交媒體專頁發佈關於對候選人的帖文穿鑿附會，當作輔證，而非僅以候選人是否有簽署確認書為單獨基礎作判斷。

去年立法會補選，時任東區民政事務專員鄧如欣獲委任為選舉主任，居然拒絕周庭小姐簽署的確認書，以周庭小姐及其所屬政黨昔日的言論去佐證選舉主任荒唐的理由，去褫奪周庭小姐的參選資格，並且沒有給予周庭小姐公平機會回應選舉主任的無理指控，實在令人憤慨。

由建議指引可見，選舉管理委員會並無引入任何措施或保障，去堵塞上述不合理、不合法、不合憲的漏洞。今後選舉主任依然可以使用此漏洞，依據其個人的政治目的或理念，惡意褫奪任何香港市民的參選資格。

選舉管理委員會於第三章第一部分（3.1）指：「根據法例，候選人的提名是否有效 ，完全是由選舉主任作出決定，選管會無權並一向沒有參與， 亦不會給予任何意見。」此點完全不可接受。當選舉管理委員會對選舉主任按其個人政治取向褫奪候選人參選資格的權力不作任何箝制、監察或審查， 又能如何履行其法定職責，「確保在香港舉行的選舉是以公開、公平和誠實的方式進行」呢？

建議指引並無對選舉主任如何可於短促的提名期內研究並審查任何候選人的政治理念及昔日言論有任何著墨。 建議指引亦未有論及選舉主任會否收到其他機構的秘密意見或者偏頗意見。上述的其他機構，例如律政司、內地及政制事務局、民政事務總署或政府新聞處等，可能預先詳細記錄相關候選人的昔日言論。據悉，上述由第三方準備的詳細記錄可能不合法地導致選舉主任作出褫奪候選人選舉資格的危險決定。

本人必須提醒選舉管理委員會，被選舉權是獲香港基本法及香港人權法案保障的基本權利。聯合國人權事務委員會第25號一般性意見亦指出：「不得以政治見解為由剝奪任何人參加競選的權利。」

本人對建議指引並未就保障候選人不被選舉主任按其個人喜惡褫奪資格，防止選舉主任非法干預選舉採取任何措施深感失望。選舉管理委員會必須詳細檢視自己對上述問題有何解決方法。

就選舉主任褫奪參選資格的合法性，目前透過選舉呈請，並於選舉完結一兩年後由法庭裁決的安排實在強差人意。當中所耗的時間令公義遲來。
本人對建議指引第三章完全反對。本人懇求主席重新並獨立審視第三章所包含的所有程序。在重新審視的時候，懇請閣下撇除並抗拒所有政治考量，尤其是來自行政長官、政制及事務內地局、律政司及其他政府機構企圖干預未來區議會選舉的誠信和公平性的政治考量。

敬祝 鈞安 XXXXXXXX 敬上

2019年7月9日

2019年5月17日，台灣成為全亞洲第一個同性結婚合法的國家。早上下大雨的天空在立法院投票後突然變成美麗的晴天讓大家穿在身上的彩虹出來陪天空的真正的彩虹🌈

台灣一直都是很先進的國家，而且那天也成為全亞洲第一個有同性結婚法律的國家 同時也成為亞洲裡更特別的寶物

我這個外國人那天在立法院外面的現場跟著大群支持者支持這個權利。現場的氣氛那麼特別我非跟全球分享不可。

我想恭喜全部度過這個很長的一條路的人，也跟大家分享我的故事

兩年前台灣司法院出來說同性戀應該也要有權利結婚不過因為台灣法律的程序，有兩年的時間來修法律不然會自動執行

大家好～ 我是Brian，一個來自美國，住在台灣的台北的外國人。我住台灣快10年，學中文快15年。歡迎來到Brian愛台灣～

❤️🧡💛💚💙💜

On May 17, 2019, Taiwan became the first country in Asia to make gay marriage legal! What started as a rainy turned into a beautiful sunny day just after the votes to legalize marriage for all were made, letting the rainbows worn by those at the support rally become amplified by real rainbows in the sky.

Taiwan has always been a progressive nation, and, yesterday, it became the first country in Asia to have a gay marriage law; making it an even more unique treasure here in Asia.

I was outside the building at the support rally, and the atmosphere there was so special and unique that I just had to share it with the world.

I want to offer my congratulations to all those who
have endured such a difficult journey.

I also want to share my story with you.

Two years ago, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court ruled that marriage was a right for all. Due to legal processes in Taiwan, however, there was a two year waiting period during which legislators had the opportunity to alter the law, otherwise the change would automatically go into effect.

The Legislative Yuan, the legislative branch of the government, held a hearing to vote on the proposed bills regarding same-sex marriage.

Hi, I’m Brian. A foreigner from America (the US) who has lived in Taipei, Taiwan for nearly 10 years and studied Mandarin Chinese for nearly 15 years. Welcome to Brian2Taiwan.

❤️🧡💛💚💙💜

Please PLEASE share and help me show the world how special Taiwan really is~
Sorry for the mistakes in the subtitles.
I did all the shooting, editing, and captioning myself, so some mistakes, inevitably, got by me. Thanks.

拜託拜託幫我分享，讓我告訴全台灣全球台灣多獨特～ 字幕裡的錯誤請見了. 因為自己拍攝、剪片、上字幕，難免有一些錯誤被我錯過. 謝謝

Youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/c/Brian2Taiwan

Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/Brian2Taiwan

Instagram:
www.instagram.com/Brian2Taiwan

Twitter:
@Brian2Taiwan

#taiwan #gaymarriage #samesexmarriage

* 需要中文字幕請記得打開CC字幕喔！*
【平權公投 Taiwan Equal Rights Referendum】
每一個人，都擁有平等愛人及被愛的權利。
性別，也不該是用二分法就能解釋的概念。

從大法官釋憲後，彩虹終於開始像雨後初晴般地逐漸閃耀。
就差最後一哩路了！
#同性婚姻 ，#性平教育，是我們都需要共同理解的議題。
#讓愛沒有局外人，我們一起努力。

Everyone should have the right to love and be loved and gender binary is no longer enough to explain the modern gender concept. Finally, after the constitutional interpretation on same-sex marriage, the rainbow which acts as the bridge between people’s love and pride shines ever so brightly. The finish line for equal rights is just in sight and we need everyone’s support!

#SameSexMarriage #GenderEquityEducation #LGBTQ

Let’s work together to create a future where love excludes nobody.


公投 14, 15案，請投同意。
10, 11, 12案，請投不同意。
兩好三壞，年滿18歲，即可投票！
11月24號，大家一起，回家投票吧！

——

此部影片是由英國愛丁堡大學的台灣學生主動發起，目的在於跟當地的學生群體交流對婚姻平權及性平教育的看法。同時也將來自世界各地學生對本次公投的聲援，紀錄下來。

雖然適逢期末考期間，留學生無法返鄉投票，但仍希望能盡其所能，為平權努力！

This video was a campaign initiated by Taiwanese students studying at the University of Edinburgh. The purpose of this campaign was to provide a platform for education and exchange of opinions on the topic of Taiwan equal rights referendum. Meanwhile, the video was recorded to convey the supports on Taiwan equal right referendum from students worldwide.

Special Thanks to:
Leena Hoppula
Dzaui Jansen
Solly Peng
Estelle Heng

——

相關網頁：
平權前夕·彩虹起義：https://www.facebook.com/Vote4LGBT/
公投怎麼投：https://nofear.equallove.tw/
Equal Rights Referendum：https://nofear.equallove.tw/en

—

👧🏻 更多Vivi相關資訊 More Vivi 👧🏻


➪ Blog: http://vivilin.me

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➪ E-mail: viviofficialchannel@gmail.com (Business Inquiries ONLY 工作邀約專用)


⚠️強力募集 中英字幕小幫手⚠️
Vivi應該算是個超愛講話語速又超快的YouTuber，大家敲碗字幕的心聲我都有聽到啊啊啊～～～
所以即刻強力徵求❣️字幕小幫手❣️
如果你願意幫Vi上這支影片的字幕，請簡單兩步驟，即刻行動🙌🏻
1.寄信到viviofficialchannel@gmail.com
2.信裡面告訴Vivi你的youtube帳號與希望幫忙的影片名稱

成功加入字幕後，Vivi會從愛丁堡寄送手寫明信片加小禮物表達對小幫手萬分的感謝❤️

* 本支影片字幕感謝Alice Lin的大力協助！！！*

-

Heyyyyyyyy!!!!
非常謝謝大家的收看！！！
你們的每一則留言每一次點讚都是我最大的原動力！
謝謝每一位點進來的朋友們，也謝謝一直以來陪伴著我走在這趟旅程裡的你們。
有任何想跟Vivi說的話或是想問的問題都可以在下面留言喔！
希望你們會喜歡這支影片 ❤️

Heyyyyyyy!!!
Thank you for watching the video and all your support!!! Each of your comments and likes on my videos and channel has been the most important part of this incredible journey!!!
Hope you all enjoy the video~~~~~
Kisses and huggies, love you guys as always♥︎

FTC: This video is not sponsored.