communist country中文的八卦，Yahoo名人娛樂都在討論

[時事英文] 蔡英文總統BBC專訪關鍵英文詞彙

今天要來與大家分享蔡英文總統的BBC專訪! It's an insightful one!

★★★★★★★★★★★★

專訪(中文): https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51115705

專訪(英文): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

報導內有影片!

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen has told the BBC that China needs to "face reality" and show the island "respect".

1. face reality 面對現實
2. show respect 表示尊重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

She was re-elected for a second term on Saturday, winning by a landslide after a campaign in which she focused heavily on the rising threat from Beijing.

3. win by a landslide 以壓倒性優勢獲勝
4. focus heavily on... 特別專注於...
5. rising threat 上升的威脅

★★★★★★★★★★★★

The Chinese Communist Party has long claimed sovereignty over Taiwan and the right to take it by force if necessary. Ms Tsai* insisted that the sovereignty of the self-governing island was not in doubt or up for negotiation.

-\-\BBC

6. the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨
7. claim sovereignty 主張主權
8. take it by force 以武力攻下台灣
9. the sovereignty of ...的主權
10. self governing 自治的
11. not in doubt 毫無疑問
12. not up for negotiation 不能談判

*President Tsai

★★★★★★★★★★★★

"We don't have a need to declare ourselves an independent state," the 63-year-old president told the BBC in an exclusive interview, her first since the election. "We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan."

13. declare 宣布
14. an independent state 一個獨立的國家；政府
15. exclusive interview 專訪
16. an independent country 一個獨立國家

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Such statements infuriate Beijing, which wants a return to the "One China" principle favoured by the main rival she saw off in the race for president, Han Kuo-yu from the Kuomintang party. His party traces its roots to the defeated nationalists in the Chinese civil war, who fled to Taiwan and continued to see the island as part of a greater China from which they had been usurped.

17. infuriate 激怒
18. return to 還給, 歸回
19. main rival 主要競爭對手
20. trace its roots 追根溯源
21. defeated the nationalists 戰敗的國民黨
22. flee to 逃往
23. be usurped 被篡奪

★★★★★★★★★★★★

In recent years, that concept of One China has proved a useful compromise, Taiwanese supporters of it argue. China insists on its acceptance as a prerequisite for building economic ties with Taiwan, precisely because doing so is an explicit denial of its existence as a de facto island state.

24. a useful compromise 有用的協定, 妥協
25. insist on 堅持
26. a prerequisite for... ...的先決條件
27. build economic ties 建立經濟聯繫
28. a explicit denial 明確否認
29. de facto 事實上

★★★★★★★★★★★★

But it is clear that Ms Tsai* believes her victory is proof of how little appetite there now is for the One China concept and the ambiguity it allowed over Taiwan's real status. "The situation has changed," she says. "The ambiguity can no longer serve the purposes it was intended to serve." And what has really changed, she suggests, is China.

-\-\BBC

30. it is clear that… ...是清楚的
31. proof of… …的證明
32. how little appetite there is for... 對...沒有多少胃口; 對...不接受
33. One China concept 一個中國的概念
34. ambiguity 模棱兩可
35. real status 真實狀態
36. intend to serve… 所欲實現的（成效）

*President Tsai

★★★★★★★★★★★★

"Because [for more than] three years we're seeing China has been intensifying its threat... they have their military vessels and aircraft cruising around the island," she says. "And also, the things happening in Hong Kong, people get a real sense that this threat is real and it's getting more and more serious."

37. intensify its threat 加劇威脅
38. military vessels and aircrafts 軍艦和飛機
39. get more serious 變得更嚴重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Taiwan's interests, she believes, are not best served by semantics but by facing up to the reality, in particular the aspirations of the Taiwanese youth who flocked to her cause. "We have a separate identity and we're a country of our own. So, if there's anything that runs counter to this idea, they will stand up and say that's not acceptable to us. "We're a successful democracy, we have a pretty decent economy, we deserve respect from China."

40. Taiwan’s interests are not best served by semantics. 文字遊戲並非最佳實現台灣利益（的方式）
41. semantics 語義學; 文字遊戲
42. face up to reality 面對現實
43. the aspirations of the Taiwanese youth 台灣青年的志向
44. flock to her cause 湧向她的目標
45. a separate identity 一個單獨的、不同的身份
46. run counter to 違反；有悖常理，背道而馳
47. a decent economy 像樣的、相當不錯的經濟制度
48. deserve respect 值得尊重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Sources

https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51115705

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

https://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5098630

Image source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

★★★★★★★★★★★★

時事英文大全: https://wp.me/p44l9b-1Y8

[時事英文] 蔡英文總統BBC專訪關鍵英文詞彙

今天要來與大家分享蔡英文總統的BBC專訪! It's an insightful one!

★★★★★★★★★★★★

專訪(中文): https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51115705

專訪(英文): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

報導內有影片!

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen has told the BBC that China needs to "face reality" and show the island "respect".

1. face reality 面對現實
2. show respect 表示尊重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

She was re-elected for a second term on Saturday, winning by a landslide after a campaign in which she focused heavily on the rising threat from Beijing.

3. win by a landslide 以壓倒性優勢獲勝
4. focus heavily on... 特別專注於...
5. rising threat 上升的威脅

★★★★★★★★★★★★

The Chinese Communist Party has long claimed sovereignty over Taiwan and the right to take it by force if necessary. Ms Tsai* insisted that the sovereignty of the self-governing island was not in doubt or up for negotiation.

--BBC

6. the Chinese Communist Party 中國共產黨
7. claim sovereignty 主張主權
8. take it by force 以武力攻下台灣
9. the sovereignty of ...的主權
10. self governing 自治的
11. not in doubt 毫無疑問
12. not up for negotiation 不能談判

*President Tsai

★★★★★★★★★★★★

"We don't have a need to declare ourselves an independent state," the 63-year-old president told the BBC in an exclusive interview, her first since the election. "We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan."

13. declare 宣布
14. an independent state 一個獨立的國家；政府
15. exclusive interview 專訪
16. an independent country 一個獨立國家

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Such statements infuriate Beijing, which wants a return to the "One China" principle favoured by the main rival she saw off in the race for president, Han Kuo-yu from the Kuomintang party. His party traces its roots to the defeated nationalists in the Chinese civil war, who fled to Taiwan and continued to see the island as part of a greater China from which they had been usurped.

17. infuriate 激怒
18. return to 還給, 歸回
19. main rival 主要競爭對手
20. trace its roots 追根溯源
21. defeated the nationalists 戰敗的國民黨
22. flee to 逃往
23. be usurped 被篡奪

★★★★★★★★★★★★

In recent years, that concept of One China has proved a useful compromise, Taiwanese supporters of it argue. China insists on its acceptance as a prerequisite for building economic ties with Taiwan, precisely because doing so is an explicit denial of its existence as a de facto island state.

24. a useful compromise 有用的協定, 妥協
25. insist on 堅持
26. a prerequisite for... ...的先決條件
27. build economic ties 建立經濟聯繫
28. a explicit denial 明確否認
29. de facto 事實上

★★★★★★★★★★★★

But it is clear that Ms Tsai* believes her victory is proof of how little appetite there now is for the One China concept and the ambiguity it allowed over Taiwan's real status. "The situation has changed," she says. "The ambiguity can no longer serve the purposes it was intended to serve." And what has really changed, she suggests, is China.

--BBC

30. it is clear that… ...是清楚的
31. proof of… …的證明
32. how little appetite there is for... 對...沒有多少胃口; 對...不接受
33. One China concept 一個中國的概念
34. ambiguity 模棱兩可
35. real status 真實狀態
36. intend to serve… 所欲實現的（成效）

*President Tsai

★★★★★★★★★★★★

"Because [for more than] three years we're seeing China has been intensifying its threat... they have their military vessels and aircraft cruising around the island," she says. "And also, the things happening in Hong Kong, people get a real sense that this threat is real and it's getting more and more serious."

37. intensify its threat 加劇威脅
38. military vessels and aircrafts 軍艦和飛機
39. get more serious 變得更嚴重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Taiwan's interests, she believes, are not best served by semantics but by facing up to the reality, in particular the aspirations of the Taiwanese youth who flocked to her cause. "We have a separate identity and we're a country of our own. So, if there's anything that runs counter to this idea, they will stand up and say that's not acceptable to us. "We're a successful democracy, we have a pretty decent economy, we deserve respect from China."

40. Taiwan’s interests are not best served by semantics. 文字遊戲並非最佳實現台灣利益（的方式）
41. semantics 語義學; 文字遊戲
42. face up to reality 面對現實
43. the aspirations of the Taiwanese youth 台灣青年的志向
44. flock to her cause 湧向她的目標
45. a separate identity 一個單獨的、不同的身份
46. run counter to 違反；有悖常理，背道而馳
47. a decent economy 像樣的、相當不錯的經濟制度
48. deserve respect 值得尊重

★★★★★★★★★★★★

Sources

https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-51115705

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

https://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5098630

Image source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246

★★★★★★★★★★★★

時事英文大全: https://wp.me/p44l9b-1Y8

I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”

Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.

What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.

But that might not exactly be the case.

The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.

During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.

At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.

All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.

Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.

Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.

It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.

Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.

Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.

Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.

In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.

As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.

Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.

The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center

最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普，中國的「川建國」>，其中一小段是這樣的

「在中國，人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」

裡面也提到，川普在任的幾年，國家更分裂，對於氣候變遷，傳統美國盟友，乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣，對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針，導致美國在世界的評價降低，波頓的新書也多有描述。

除此之外，許多不幸相信中共宣傳，又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅，特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。

但這不是真的。

中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方，去增強其在世界的領導力。

在2016年時，秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間，習近平政權爭取（RCEP）及亞太自由貿易區（FTAAP）談判；對比2017年初，美國剛宣布退出ＴＰＰ，加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行，中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。

也是那個時候，各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落，似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。

這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時（2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高，根據皮尤研究中心的資訊，英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%

如果那時中共開始有限度的改革，對內放寬言論自由，或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中，對外追求有責任的基礎建設，逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘，對於國有企業改革，增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。

停止對新疆迫害，不干預香港自治，不僅國際形象會大幅改善，哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革，也會讓大量吸引外資，讓中國的活力持續前進。

哪怕是什麼都不做也好

那或許有這麽一點可能性，中國「夢」是可以前行的

但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。

習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗，徹底的走向相反的方向。

更專制、更沒有彈性，更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交，讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使，捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是，就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情，中共都沒有少做。

中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國，在多重國內外的衝擊之下，又是瘟疫，又是超大水患，緊接著蝗害，還有進來的糧食不足問題，正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。

而糧食的命脈，卻恰恰又在對他最不信任，對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟

根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度，美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等，對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下

而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度，更高達73%。

最近中共在演習，又要玩轉移目標的手段，對於中共，其實不必再有民族主義的同情，因為新的世紀，價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。

中國離我們只有130公里的距離，我們當然歡迎對話，避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國，歡迎對話，但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。

如果真的要有前提，那就是對等、尊重，還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。

資料來源：皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
（美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構，https://www.pewresearch.org/）