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- Các bạn ơi, hôm nay chúng ta cùng tìm hiểu về LINKING WORDS - CONTRASTING IDEAS nhé.
Những từ như Conjunction (but, although, though), Adverbials (however, in contrast, nevertheless, on the contrary, on the other hand), Thể hiện sự tương phản (Though, Although) đều quan trọng, ứng dụng nhiều nên các bạn lưu lại nha.
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Update: I think the site has crashed from all the traffic. Here is the text of the post. Or go here: http://imgur.com/BYpU0SE?r
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ATTENTION SEEKING KID – KEOW WEE LOONG
writing & imagery by:
ARKADIUSZ PODNIESIŃSKI
18 lipca, 2016
People interested in Fukushima have almost certainly heard of the ‘sensational’ post by Keow Wee Loong, a 28-year-old man from Malaysia who claims that he travelled illegally around Fukushima’s ‘no-go’ zones. It turns out, however, that his story is almost completely fabricated. Unfortunately, the story by this man, who hid his face behind a gas mask, was so convincing that people swallowed it whole and it rapidly spread around the world. His story and photos were published in on reputable services like TIME, CNN and hundreds of others. And, as the author himself admits, he gave 34 interviews in a single day. The entire story of his trip through the no-go zones, sneaking through the forest and avoiding the police is a fiction by a man seeking fame and attention, as opposed to the real popularity that he undoubtedly generated.
woo-posts
screenshot of Keow Wee Loong’s Facebook profile – www.facebook.com/uglykiwi and www.facebook.com/KeowPhotography
Keow Wee Loong’s story strongly recalls the story of Elena Filatova, a.k.a. ‘the Kidd of Speed’. This young woman claimed to have made an illegal solo motorcycle trip through the closed, radioactive zone in Chernobyl and hid her face under a motorcycle helmet. In reality, she never drove her motorcycle through the closed zone and all of her photographs were taken outside the zone or during a tourist coach trip, which she went on dressed in motorcycle gear and a helmet.
Keow Wee Loong’s story is similar. Besides having deliberately created a sensational text and portrait photographs depicting him alone in a gas mask with a shopping basket in hand, it quickly became clear that, in principle, his entire text is dishonest, his trip to the no-go zones untrue and the photographs were taken in areas that everyone can access.
I have visited Fukushima many times to document the destruction caused by the disaster at the nuclear power plant, and so I did not have any major problems identifying the sites where Keow Wee Loong took his photographs. It quickly turned out that all of the photos he took were not taken in the red no-go zones as he claimed, but only in the open green zone (sometimes orange) as well as on Road No. 6, which runs through the Fukushima prefecture. All of these places are open and accessible to all.
Keow-Wee-Loong-map
Map with the locations of places where Keow Wee Loong took his photographs. In order to prevent similar behaviour, the locations of some places are approximate.
The green zone in the town of Namie, where the photographer took most of his pictures, have had this status for at least three years and have been open to all since 1 April of this year. In Tomioka, where Keow Wee Loong also took photographs, these zones were open even earlier. Anyone who wished could enter them freely already a few years ago.
Today, the streets of Namie and Tomioka are full of cars and people, which one cannot fail to notice. In Namie, there is a working police station, a petrol station and the first shops have been open. One can also see a lot of repair crews on the streets of Namie and Tomioka, as well as increasing numbers of curious tourists. Radiation in the centre of Namie is approximately 0.1 uSv/h, and is therefore normal; it does not differ from most other cities in Japan and around the world. One doesn’t need a gas mask there, much less a full-face one. It isn’t necessary to hide from the police or hike through the woods for hours to get to Namie or Tomioka. Anyone who wants to can go there without permission.
Only access to the most contaminated zones, referred to as red or no-go zones, located closest to the power plant and contaminated from the radioactive fallout require a special permit. Contrary to the claims of Keow Wee Loong, he never managed to get to these places. Legally or not. Contrary to what he says, a permit can be obtained in just a week – you just have to demonstrate and justify an important public interest. Evidently, however, Keow Wee Long could not justify any public interest.
Why am I writing about all of this?
My interest is not to trivialise the catastrophic consequences of the failures of nuclear power plants. When I was 14 years old, I had to drink liquid iodine, which would help stop the absorption of the radioactive iodine isotope coming from the damaged reactor in Chernobyl. For these and other reasons, I have devoted the last 8 years to the subject of Chernobyl (I have been there dozens of times), as well as with the subject of Fukushima from the moment the disaster in Japan happened (I have visited 4 times in the past year, spending more than a month in total there). During this time, I have seen the effects of nuclear disasters enough to be opposed to this form of energy production.
I am, however, a strong opponent of seeking sensationalism, 15 minutes of fame and the money that comes with it, which has become synonymous for me with Keow Wee Loong. Photographers and writers of unreliable and inaccurate texts, which are then replicated by hundreds of media outlets around the world, create a false picture of the current situation in Fukushima. This is particularly important here as, in contrast to Chernobyl, the consequences of the disaster are still fresh and painful. To date, nearly 100,000 evacuees are still out of their homes. Many of them are following the progress of the disaster recovery works and often base their decision to return (or not) on media reports.
I think that the international community, Japanese society and, above all, the evacuated residents should have reliable information about the places where they once lived and where I hope they will shortly be able to return.
Arkadiusz Podniesiński
Photographer
www.podniesinski.pl
P.S. I only very rarely ask for my articles to be shared. This is an exception because it’s really important. Share it!
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"I have visited Fukushima many times to document the destruction caused by the disaster at the nuclear power plant, and so I did not have any major problems identifying the sites where Keow Wee Loong took his photographs. It quickly turned out that all of the photos he took were not taken in the red no-go zones as he claimed, but only in the open green zone (sometimes orange) as well as on Road No. 6, which runs through the Fukushima prefecture. All of these places are open and accessible to all."
- Polish photographer Arkadiusz Podniesiński who has photographed Chernobyl and Fukushima No-Go zones for real.
#guagua
【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣：
The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.
What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?
While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.
COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?
To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.
Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.
Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.
The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric
While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.
Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.
Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.
Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.
The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.
On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.
Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”
The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention
But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.
Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.
This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.
However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?
▶️ 國安法：中國的現實主義框架
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjhRbV8qTgo
⏺ 中美夏威夷峰會
https://www.patreon.com/posts/38378214
LINKING WORDS - CONTRASTING IDEAS SIÊU QUAN TRỌNG
? Xem chi tiết Linking Words cho Writing: http://bit.ly/2oGWZv2
- Các bạn ơi, hôm nay chúng ta cùng tìm hiểu về LINKING WORDS - CONTRASTING IDEAS nhé. Những từ như Conjunction (but, although, though), Adverbials (however, in contrast, nevertheless, on the contrary, on the other hand), Thể hiện sự tương phản (Though, Although) đều quan trọng, ứng dụng nhiều nên các bạn lưu lại nha.
Chúc các bạn học tốt nhé!
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#lingking_Words #IELTSFIGHTER
Oct 3, 2020 - 25 Connectors of Contrast Words By contrast Nonetheless On the other ... Though Even tough On the contrary Nevertheless In spite of Because of ... ... <看更多>
on the contrary, in contrast 在 [分享] By contrast, In contrast, Contrary to, - 看板TOEFL_iBT 的八卦
By contrast, In contrast, Contrary to, On the contrary的差別
Smith was industrious. By contrast, his brother was lazy.
They went to Texas. In contrast, we went to California.
By contrast 是做"比較compare"完全相反用的，In contrast 是有"注意notice"
difference差異用的。
Contrary to the common belief, pigs are not stupid.
Contrary to N（the common belief）, 是名詞the common belief= pigs are stupid與
後面的敘述相反。
On the contrary
用來反駁對方見解、觀點用的
(與此)相反, 正相反, 恰恰相反
You think you are clever; on the contrary, I assure that you are very foolish.
你自以為很聰明, 相反地, 我確信你很傻。
On the contrary he was the most ruthless person I have ever known.
相反,他是我所見過的最冷酷無情的人.
On the contrary, I took up another resolution, which was more safe, though
more laborious.
相反地, 我作了另外一個決定, 雖然比較費勁, 卻比較安全.
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