ultra vires
【回覆選舉主任的追問】(Please scroll down for English version)
(選舉主任於11月28日下午四點的追問: https://goo.gl/unqfuP )
我們剛才已經回覆選舉主任,內容如下。感謝法夢成員黃先生協助,大家可參考他的文章:
村代表唔係《基本法》第104條所列既公職喎!
https://bit.ly/2AuHXKD
全文:
「
袁先生:
就你於 2018 年 11 月 28 日來函,現謹覆如下:
█(一)鄉郊代表選舉主任無權提出與確保提名有效無關的問題
1. 我認為你並無權力提出與確保提名有效無關的問題。謹闡釋如 下‥
2. 《鄉郊代表選舉條例》第 24 條規定,「除非提名某人為鄉郊地 區的選舉的候選人的提名表格載有或附有一項由該人簽署的聲明,示明該人會擁護《基本法》和保證效忠香港特別行政區,否則該人不得 獲有效提名。」
《選舉程序(鄉郊代表選舉)規例》第 7(3)條則規定,為了「令[選 舉]主任信納 ... 提名是有效的」,「選舉主任可要求獲提名為候選人的人提供提名表格沒有涵蓋而該主任認為需要的資料」。
3. 區慶祥法官在「陳浩天案」處理過《立法會條例》及 《選舉管 理委員會(選舉程序)(立法會)規例》下的類似條文。即使退一萬步,假設區慶祥在該案中所陳述的法律屬正確(即選舉主任擁有調查候選人 政治信念的權力,而這並無違反人權),「陳浩天案」中有關立法會選 舉的邏輯,亦不可能同樣適用於鄉郊代表選舉。
區慶祥法官考慮過他所認為的立法歷史後(包括籌委會 1996 及1997 年區生認為對立法會選舉方式具約束力的決定),將《立法會條 例》第 40(1)(b)(i)條解讀為是為了執行《基本法》第 104 條而訂立, 所以裁定選舉主任在該條下有權調查候選人實質上是否真誠擁護《基 本法》及效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。
但鄉郊代表並非《基本法》第 104 條中列出的'high office holders of the HKSAR'(「陳浩天案」判詞第 42 段;即「行政長官、主要官員、行政會議成員、立法會議員、各級法院法官和其他司法人員」)。即使是人大常委會 2016 年 11 月 7 日通過對《基本法》第 104 條的解釋, 亦僅指「[第 104 條]規定的宣誓 ... 是參選或者出任該條所列公職的 法定要求和條件。」
4. 再者,立法會在訂立《村代表選舉條例》(2014 年改稱《鄉郊代表選舉條例》)時,完全並無如訂立《立法會條例》時般,考慮或 討論過當中第 24 條下有關聲明規定的內容,背後更無任何有約束力 的決定,要求村代表/鄉郊代表須擁護《基本法》及效忠中華人民共 和國香港特別行政區。
反而時任民政事務局局長何志平 2002 年在動議二讀《村代表選舉條例草案》時清晰地指出,「本條例草案的目的,是為村代表選舉 制定法律條文,以確保選舉公開、公平和公正,並符合《 香港人權法案條例》和《性別歧視條例》的要求」(2002 年 10 月 9 日立法會 會議過程正式紀錄頁 64)。
5. 無論如何,即使區慶祥法官亦須承認,任何有關的聲明規定, 必須從選舉、被選權等基本權利的背景下理解(「陳浩天案」判詞第 80 段)。在缺乏類似所謂立法歷史和《基本法》條文的支持下,實在 難以接受《村代表選舉條例》/《鄉郊代表選舉條例》第 24 條具有 跟《立法會條例》第 40(1)(b)(i)條一樣的效力(假設第 24 條本身是合 憲的話)。
法律上,選舉主任只可為了相關賦權條文的目的行使其法定權力:
'Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely - that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended . . .'
- Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 at para 19 per Lord Bingham quoting
Wade and Forsyth.
(亦可參考 Wong Kam Yuen v Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing [2003] 2 HKC 21 (HKCFI) at para 21 per Hartmann J.)
在這方面,《選舉程序(鄉郊代表選舉)規例》第 7(3)條的目的,是確保提名屬有效。如果《鄉郊代表選舉條例》第 24 條在正確的理解 下,並無強制候選人實質上證明自己擁護《基本法》和保證效忠中華 人民共和國香港特別行政區,亦即提名的有效性,並不依賴候選人的 實質政治信念,《規例》第 7(3)條自然就不可能賦權選舉主任作出與 此有關的提問,否則他或她行事的目的,就是法律並無授權、亦無預 見(假設《立法會條例》具此效果)的政治審查,而非確保提名的有 效性。
故此,我認為你並無權力提出與確保提名有效無關的問題。
█(二)回應提問(a):你認為我沒有正面回答你的問題,我並不同意你的說法,因為你的問題帶着錯誤的假設。你的問題假設「自決前 途」只能為一個特定機制,因此才有所謂主張香港獨立是否其中一個 「選項」的錯誤設想。然而,正如我昨日的回覆所指,「我提倡或支 持推動《基本法》和政制的民主化改革,包括但不限於修改《基本法》 158 及 159 條,作為中共封殺真普選後,港人自決前途的目標」;與 此同時,我沒有主張「香港獨立」。
█(三)回應提問(b):你在今日的回信中指「並沒有要求你就其他人的行為或主張表達意見」,不過,提問(b)的意思正是要求任何人若 希望成為鄉郊代表選舉候選人,不單自己不可主張港獨,也要明確地 反對甚至禁止其他參選人有相關主張。我認為這個要求違反《基本法》 及《香港人權法案條例》對言論自由的保障,亦顯然超出《鄉郊代表 選舉條例》對參選人的要求。
請你儘快就我於 2018 年 11 月 22 日提交的提名表格、11 月 27 日的回覆及上述的答覆,決定我的提名是否有效。若你需要其他的補充資料,請以電郵聯絡我。我就你的查詢保留一切權利。
2018 年 11 月 28 日
二零一九年鄉郊一般選舉
元崗新村選舉參選人
朱凱廸
」
【Reply to More Questions from Returning Officer】
Mr. Yuen,
I hereby reply to your letter dated 28 November:
█(1) Returning Officer of Rural Representative Election has no power to make any inquiries not made with a view to ensuring the validity of nomination
1. I consider that you have no power to make any inquiries insofar as they are not made with a view to ensuring the validity of my nomination. My reasons are as follows.
2. Section 24 of the Rural Representative Election Ordinance provides that “[a] person is not validly nominated as a candidate for an election for a Rural Area unless the nomination form includes or is accompanied by a declaration, signed by the person, to the effect that the person will uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
On the other hand, section 7(3) of the Electoral Procedure (Rural Representative Election) Regulation provides that, “in order [for the Returning Officer] to be satisfied … as to the validity of the nomination”, “[t]he Returning Officer may require a person who is nominated as a candidate to furnish such information which is not covered by the nomination form as that Officer considers necessary”.
3. In Chan Ho Tin v Lo Ying Ki Alan [2018] 2 HKLRD 7, Mr Justice Thomas Au Hing-cheung (“Au J”) considered similar provisions in the Legislative Council Ordinance and the Electoral Affairs Commission (Electoral Procedure) (Legislative Council) Regulation. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the law as stated by Au J in that case were correct (namely that a Returning Officer has the power to inquire into the political beliefs of a candidate, without violating human rights), it is clear that the reasoning as applied in the case of Chan Ho Tin, which relates solely to Legislative Council elections, cannot be extended by analogy to Rural Representative Elections.
Having considered what he thought to be the legislative history (including two Resolutions passed by the Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1996 and 1997 respectively which Au J believed to be binding), Au J interpreted section 40(1)(b)(i) of the Legislative Council Ordinance as having been enacted for the purpose of implementing Article 104 of the Basic Law, and decided on that basis that the Returning Officer had under that section the power to inquire whether a candidate, as a matter of substance, genuinely upholds the Basic Law and pledges allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
The important distinction, however, is that rural representatives are not those “high office holders of the HKSAR” listed in Article 104 of the Basic Law (Chan Ho Tin at para 42; namely “the Chief Executive, principal officials, members of the Executive Council and of the Legislative Council, judges of the courts at all levels and other members of the judiciary”). Even the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in its Interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law adopted on 7 November 2016, merely states that ‘the legal requirements and preconditions [contained in Article 104 are] for standing for election in respect of or taking up the public office specified in the Article.’
4. Further, unlike when enacting the Legislative Council Ordinance, the Legislative Council in enacting the Village Representative Election Ordinance (renamed in 2014 the Rural Representative Election Ordinance) never discussed nor gave any consideration whatsoever to the content of the requirement of declarations, still less to binding resolution of any sort which would compel Village Representatives (now Rural Representatives) to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
What the then Secretary for Home Affairs, Patrick Ho Chi-ping, did clearly pointed out, in moving the Second Reading of the Village Representative Election Bill in 2002, is that “[t]he purpose of the Bill is to bring Village Representative (VR) elections under a statutory framework in order to ensure that they are conducted in an open, fair and honest manner and that they are consistent with the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Sex Discrimination Ordinance” (Legislative Council, Official Record of Proceedings (9 October 2002) at p 90)
5. In any event, even Au J has had to concede that any relevant requirement of declarations “must be viewed against the involvement of the fundamental election right” (Chan Ho Tin at para 80). Here, in the absence of similar so-called legislative history or Basic Law provisions in support, it is difficult to accept that section 24 of the Village Representative Election Ordinance (now the Rural Representative Election Ordinance) is intended to have the same effect as section 40(1)(b)(i) of the Legislative Council Ordinance (on the assumption that section 24 were not unconstitutional).
In law, the Returning Officer may only exercise her statutory powers for the public purpose for which the powers were conferred:
'Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely - that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended . . .'
- Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 at para 19 per Lord Bingham quoting Wade and Forsyth.
(See also Wong Kam Yuen v Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing [2003] 2 HKC 21 (HKCFI) at para 21 per Hartmann J.)
In this regard, the object of section 7(3) of the Electoral Procedure (Rural Representative Election) Regulation is to ensure that a candidate’s nomination is valid. If, properly construed, section 24 of the Rural Representative Election Ordinance does not have the effect of compelling candidates to prove, as a matter of substance, that they uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, then the validity of the nomination does not turn on the substantive political beliefs of the candidate. Section 7(3) of the Regulation, in turn, logically cannot have empowered the Returning Officer to make inquiries in this connection, for otherwise the Officer would be acting for the purpose of political screening, which is neither authorised nor envisaged by law (assuming that the Legislative Council Ordinance does, by contrast, have this effect), rather than of ensuring the validity of the nomination.
Accordingly, it is my considered view that you have no power to make any inquiries insofar as they are not made with a view to ensuring the validity of my nomination.
█(2) In answer to question (a): you take the view that I have not directly answered your question, but I do not agree, because your said question carries mistaken assumptions. Your question assumes "self-determination" can only take the form of one designated mechanism, and hence the mistaken hypothesis on whether Hong Kong independence constitute an "option" for such mechanism. However, as stated in my reply yesterday, "I advocate or support moving for democratic reform of the Basic Law and the political system, including but not limited to amending articles 158 and 159 of the Basic Law, as a goal for the Hong Kong people in determining their own future after the Communist Party of China banned genuine universal suffrage"; at the same time, I do not advocate for "Hong Kong independence".
█(3) In answer to question (b): You stated in your reply today "did not require (me) to express opinion on other people's actions or propositions", but the meaning of question (b) is precisely a requirement on anyone, if they wish to become eligible as a candidate for Rural Representative elections, not only to not advocate for Hong Kong independence themselves, but must also clearly oppose or prohibit other nominees in having related propositions. I am of the view that this requirement violates the protections on freedom of speech under the Basic law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, and clearly exceeds the requirements imposed by the Rural Representative Election Ordinance on persons nominated as a candidate.
Please confirm as soon as possible the validity of my nomination based on my nomination form submitted on 22 November 2018 and my replies to your questions dated 27 November 2018. Should you require other supplemental information, please contact me via email. I reserve all my rights in relation to your inquiry.
一名女網友爆料,表妹近日收到「聲請法院強制執行程序前通知」,
內容提到她積欠電信公司近3萬元費用,
然而表妹根本沒有申辦過該門號,
於是便前往亞太直營門市詢問,
對方當時要她不用理會,不
料日前家裡突然接到信用管理公司電話,
揚言要查封財產,讓她當場傻眼。
女網友接著說,
「結果昨天!家裡接到了這間所謂『信用管理顧問股份有限公司』的電話,
說表妹沒有繳錢,所以今天要來查封我們的動產
(表妹戶籍是寄居在家裡,但人不住家裡)
覺得莫名奇妙的我一時也聯絡不上妹妹,沒有她的身分證資料,
也不曉得打去亞太客服該怎麼說,懷疑是詐騙,只好選擇打給165詢問」。
經過了解,反詐騙專線表示,現在很多電信業者會委外處理,
但並沒有資格查封當事人財產,如果對方真的來到家裡,
可以先報警處理;原PO指出,自己還是不放心,決定致電亞太電信問清楚,
但專員卻要她打給委外公司詢問,而委外公司只是不斷背誦法條,
還嗆聲到場查封時不開門,「他們會請鎖匠來開鎖」。
什麼是強制執行?
強制執行的目的是為滿足債權人的債權
當債權人取得執行名義(調解文書、法院裁定、判決及支付命令等)之後,
如果債務人不償還債款,債權人可以透過國家公權力的介入,
強制債務人償還債款。
因此不論讀者搜尋的是「銀行欠款 強制執行」、
「繼承債務 強制執行」或是「本票 強制執行」,
意義都是在取得執行名義後(後面我們會解釋什麼是執行名義),
尋求法院的協助追討債款。
如何知道自己被強制執行?
目前網路上沒有法院強制執行查詢系統
但法院如果要進行強執行前,會寄發通知信函給債務人,
或是本人攜帶證件,親自到法院民事執行處為強制執行案件查詢。
依照強制執行法第58條的規定,
只要債務人於法拍程序拍定前提出現款,即可聲請撤銷查封。
(一) 強制執行法第14條規定,如有債權不成立或消滅或妨礙債權人請求的事由,
債務人可以於強制執行程序終結前提起異議訴訟。
(二) 強制執行法第14之1條規定,
債務人對債權人依第強制執行法第4之2條規定聲請強制執行,
如果債務人主張他並非執行名義效力所及者,
可於強制執行程序終結前,對債權人提起異議訴訟。
如何查詢自己被強制執行 在 R: [其他] 關於強制執行的問題- 看板LAW 的八卦
※ 引述《JustSad (職業被告)》之銘言:
: ※ 引述《GilGalad (皇國興廢在此一戰)》之銘言:
: : 事實經過:
: : 朋友向我借錢後人間失蹤,目前已向法院聲請支付命令,已取得支付命令確定證明書
。
: : 並已持確定證明書,向國稅局查調其所得及財產。
: : 問題:
: : 查調結果其名下無財產,所得資料內只有薪資類別數筆。
: : 但我與他往來之間,有得知他持有的數個銀行帳戶以及郵局帳戶。
: 如果他仍舊有使用這個帳戶進出,或者你知道何時會有錢匯入,或者他人在台灣。
: 你推文說他人已經不在台灣,在台灣負債累累,為何他要進出這個帳戶讓你們執行?
: 講白一點。
: 跑路時的空帳戶,就算他真有資金運用,也不會傻到拿來操作讓你們有機會執行!
: 跑路到中國的人,除了跑路的因素外,兩岸無直接匯兌且銀行也沒直接往來互通。
: 換句話說。
: 跑路到中國的台灣人,除非天時地利人和都出現特殊不可抗拒因素,不可能使用台灣帳
戶
大陸為預防私下洗錢,已經加強很多種方式
例如開戶、聯絡電話、
所以縱使是大陸銀行開戶,並非就無法取得“強制執行”
只需台灣法院確定強制執行,然後在台灣名下帳戶便可以被法院“案關扣押”
若裡面無可提供執行債權,則先取得債權憑證,但案關扣押帳戶依舊是執行標的
: 比較可能利用香港匯豐銀行或其他香港銀行,因為要轉兌比較方便也比較不會被查被執
行
: 再換句話說。
: 一般人跑路中國,資金往來會用中國人頭戶,也就是以前傳說中的小三。
: 身份地位或背景比較不一般的人跑路中國,資金往來會透過香港當轉運站。
: 只要是跑路,除非在台灣有龐大資產或其他贈與遺產,不太可能使用台灣帳戶。
: 我在中國任職時,我們這些台幹就幾乎都只會使用香港帳戶,不太用台灣銀行帳戶了。
: 正常赴中國工作的人尚且如此,何況是躲債跑路的人?
: : 請問這在聲請強制執行的時候,可以填入聲請狀內嗎?還是必須以國稅局查調結果為
準
: : 先感謝各位幫 小弟 解惑或提出建議,如內容尚有不足,盼請提出需補充之處。
: 除非你是聲請假扣押,否則我真的不懂你卡在這一段的目的、動機、意義?
: 凍機是什麼?
: 假扣押要提出想對應的擔保,好像一半還是三分之一,這一塊我比較不懂。
: 凍戶的凍機是對方有資金、存款、薪資轉入、保險受益、遺產贈與等,有錢能凍結。
: 換句話說。
: 除非你知悉未被列舉的帳戶是「其他能執行的債權人不知」+「確定帳戶有錢」。
: 否則你只是浪費時間白費心機,沒有意義。
: 其他債權人一樣能知道的帳戶,能凍他們早就凍了,還留給你獨享?
: 你不確定帳戶內是否有錢,國稅局查過有,有錢不會漏掉=沒列入的帳戶沒錢。
: 我有十幾個帳戶,主要使用或有在使用的五個,凍結戶頭時只警告兩個,最後只凍一個
。
: 因為我更換戶籍地所以執行警告公文沒收到,等我發現金額異常時才知道自己被凍結。
: 金額不大,就幾千塊,我其他金額照樣能提領進出這一個帳戶完全不影響。
: 我再強調一次,凍結戶頭只是那個時間點的凍結金額無法使用,不是永封!
: 換句話說。
: 你聲請再多帳戶執行,對他並不會造成任何困擾或限制,沒有意義。
: 你有沒有凍到,他哪天返台或心血來潮,一樣可以爽爽用這些帳戶。
: 若是他名下秘密帳戶,或許你還有一試的可能。(但秘密帳戶就不會用自己名義啊!)
: 否則你能知悉、查詢、執行的帳戶,其他債權人一樣可以。
: 合法求償與債權債務處理上,你不必天馬行空想太多,能用其他人早用了。
: 講白一點。
: 如果你白費力氣的時間金錢能併入求償金額或債務總額,隨便你玩都無妨。
: 若徒勞無功,而且額外投入的時間金錢無法併入債務求償,何苦再添一筆?
: 該做的法律流程還是繼續,但不必節外生枝自找麻煩。
: 如果他家世背景不錯+可能東山再起,法律流程跑完,遲早有機會要他還。
: 如果他沒財產也沒家世背景更沒親戚,建議你考慮債權賣斷給財務管理公司或黑道。
總結,原PO 請善加Google
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