蕭叔叔短評被譽為「人生有呢種朋友不枉此生」的黃仁龍那十頁紙求情信
全文:
http://m.mingpao.com/ins/instantnews/web_tc/article/20170220/s00001/1487583133001
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I have known Mr Donald Tsang since 2005. As Secretary for Justice (SJ), I worked closely with Donald as Chief Executive (CE) between October 2005 and June 2012. In addition to official dealings, I consider Donald to be a good friend and someone I admire for his dedication to public service.
Donald's over 40 years of service and contribution to Hong Kong is a matter of public record. Others will speak to his key role in helping Hong Kong weather through stormy financial crises. Here I would refer to his significant contributions to the public based on my own personal experience particularly in the area of the rule of law in Hong Kong.
During my 7-year tenure as SJ, I had on numerous occasions tendered legal advice to Donald as CE. He would sometimes debate with me and test the basis of the advice; but he has never acted against such legal advice. This in itself is a remarkable attribute as the head of the HKSAR.
Donald always said to me the Governors he previously worked with, however headstrong, would always abide by the legal advice of the Attorney General, and it is important that the CE of the HKSAR should stay that way.
Congo Case
One of the most important tasks, if not the most important task, of the CE of HKSAR is to faithfully and effectively implement the principle of “one country, two systems.” The power of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) to interpret the Basic Law and its exercise have always been considered a major challenge to the post-1997 constitutional order.
During my tenure as SJ, the NPCSC interpreted the Basic Law once in 2011. That was upon the reference by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) on the question of state immunity. The issue in the case is whether the People’s Republic of China’s doctrine of absolute immunity (under which no foreign state can be sued in the court at all) should be followed in Hong Kong. Prior to 1997, Hong Kong’s common law provided for restrictive immunity, where foreign states could be sued if the dispute arouse out of commercial transactions.
The HKSAR Government lost in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeal. If the Government were to lose again in the CFA, it could stir up serious political and economic repercussions for China particularly vis-à-vis her African friends. National interest of China was at stake. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was understandably very concerned.
Immense political pressure mounted. There were suggestions that Beijing should not take any risk but should consider taking more definitive measures such as an interpretation of the Basic Law before the appeal was heard. If that were to happen, on the eve of the appeal hearing, the damage to judicial independence would not be less than an overriding post-judgment interpretation.
I cannot go into further details for confidentiality reasons. However, I can testify that Donald has been solid and staunch in endorsing my stance against any extra-judicial measure in view of its adverse impact on the rule of law.
Owing in no small part to Donald’s endorsement and resolve, the Central People’s Government (CPG) was content to trust the HKSAR Government and the CFA, and to leave the appeal to be heard by the highest court, despite grave risk and many conflicting views given by others. At the end, the Government won in the CFA by a majority of 3 to 2. The Court further referred the relevant Basic Law provisions to Beijing for interpretation, as required under Article 158 of the Basic Law, before pronouncing the final judgment. A huge constitutional crisis was warded off. The rule of law had prevailed.
Over this difficult episode, I know Donald had been under tremendous pressure. I remember often times he suffered from acute acid reflux before and after major discussions. Yet he stood firm throughout.
As CE, Donald had faithfully discharged the indispensable trust reposed by both the CPG and by Hong Kong. He had the courage to stand by what he believes to be right and the ability to address mutual concerns and to strengthen mutual understanding. He had performed well the crucial bridging role in the two-way process under “one country, two systems” at critical times.
Constitutional Reform
There was another important event in which Donald’s principled stance had been vital in achieving a favourable result for Hong Kong: constitutional reform.
Although no change could be made of the imminent 2017 CE election method due to the set-backs in 2016, during Donald’s tenure as CE, he has been made significant contributions toward moving Hong Kong closer to universal suffrage.
The first landmark was achieved, with tremendous efforts by the core team under Donald’s lead, when the NPCSC delivered its decision in December 2007 setting out “the timetable” and “road map” for universal suffrage in terms of the elections of CE and Legco.
Second, in 2010, the Government managed to secure Legco’s support to pass the 2012 constitutional reform package. Here, Donald had played a pivotal role, one perhaps not many are aware of.
Whether the 2012 reform package could be passed in 2010 was crucial to ensure “gradual and orderly progress” and that the next round (i.e. the intended goals of universal suffrage in electing CE in 2017) could be achieved.
In June 2010, the original government proposal was losing support and hope was vanishing for it to be passed at Legco. Time was running out. Whether to modify the package by incorporating a proposal of the Democratic Party (i.e. the additional 5 District Council Functional Constituency seats to be elected by over 3 million electorate, “the new DCFC election method”) appeared to be the lynchpin.
Without going into details again for confidentiality reasons, I can again testify that the make-or-break moment was when Donald made the timely and difficult decision to revise the package by incorporating the new DCFC election method. It was an agonizing decision for him as he had to override certain internal opposition and to risk personal credibility and trust before the CPG. As an insider, I know that decision was not a political manoeuvre but a selfless act for the sake of the long-term wellbeing of Hong Kong and the smooth transition toward universal suffrage.
Son of Hong Kong
Donald is truly a “son of Hong Kong” (香港仔). His genuine concern for the public good is most vividly demonstrated when Hong Kong was caught in crises of one kind of another.
Hong Kong went through attacks of avian flu and swine flu. Donald tirelessly headed the cross-bureau task forces and chaired long and intensive meetings. I remember more than once Donald being caught in very heated debates with colleagues, pushing them to the limit to mobilize maximum resources and manpower, in order to give the public maximum protection against these outbreaks. He would grill colleagues over thorny issues such as requisitioning hotels as places of quarantine, not satisfied with the usual civil service response of reluctance, as lives of many were at stake.
Over the Manila hostage incident in August 2010, Donald vigorously pressed the President of the Philippines for full investigation, joining the victims’ families and the rest of Hong Kong to cry for justice, although his action raised eyebrows as foreign affairs strictly is a matter of the CPG under Article 13 of the Basic Law.
Donald had a strong concern for young people. During my tenure, exceptionally I was commissioned to chair a Steering Committee to combat drug abuse by youth. The public might not realize this initiative in fact came from Donald. He was deeply concerned and alarmed by the reports reflecting the seriousness of the problem. He was determined to tackle the problem pro-actively. The Steering Committee was unprecedented, involving concerted and strategic efforts of different departments and bureaus. More importantly, Donald was instrumental in putting in substantial and sustainable resources to strengthen the efforts. The figures of reported drug abusers, particularly among young abusers, have seen significant decline in the past few years.
Other contributions on the rule of law
There was no shortage of controversial cases involving judicial reviews and fundamental human rights. Amidst other voices and political pressure, Donald had fully taken on board the legal position that the Government has a positive duty to protect such rights, including taking reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to take place peacefully.
Further, Donald also readily took on my advice regarding procedural fairness in handling Government businesses with quasi-judicial element such as administrative appeals.
Donald truly believes in judicial independence. He assured me repeatedly the independent and internationally renowned Judiciary in the HKSAR is our pride and the cornerstone of our success. His personal commitment to this cause is manifested in his positive response in acceding to many recommendations of the Mason Report endorsed by the Standing Committee on Judicial Salaries and Conditions of Service.
Furthermore, his conviction on the importance of the law as Hong Kong’s assets was amply manifested in his exceptional support in the development of Hong Kong’s capacity as an international arbitration centre. Donald was very understanding on the need of expansion on this front and had put in personal efforts to make it happen. He was instrumental in enabling resources are in place to secure additional space for the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and to procure the arbitration arm of the International Chamber of Commerce and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission to set up regional offices in Hong Kong.
A fair man who has given much to the public
Before joining the Government, I was an Election Committee member of the Legal Subsector elected on the same ticket as Ms Audrey Eu, Mr Alan Leong and other vocal barristers. In that capacity, in 2005, I first met Donald in an election forum where I questioned him harshly and criticised the Government’s earlier attitude over certain rule of law issues. Instead of bearing any grudge, in the late summer of 2005, Donald invited me to take up the post as SJ, assuring me that he would give me full support in upholding the rule of law in Hong Kong. That quality of fairness in Donald and that personal assurance to me have never slackened in the following 7 years in which I served in his cabinet.
As CE of the HKSAR, Donald had truly poured himself out. I strongly believe his significant contributions to Hong Kong in the past over 4 decades should be properly recognized.
Dated the 20th day of Februray 2017.
Wong Yan Lung SC
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【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
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